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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -
Is THEIR A "LIFE AFTER" FOR TENDER OFFERS?
CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of America,
107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 271
II. F ACTS .................................................. 272
III. H ISTORY ................................................ 273
A. Background of W illiams Act ........................... 273
B. Emergence of State Takeover Statutes ................... 274
C. Supreme Court's ruling in Edgar v. MITE ............... 275
D. The aftermath of MITE and the lower
court's application of its rationale ....................... 277
IV . INSTANT CASE ........................................... 282
A . M ajority opinion .................................... 282
B. Scalia's concurrence .................................. 284
C . W hite's dissent ...................................... 284
V . A NALYSIS ............................................... 285
A. The unexplained departure from MITE .................. 285
B . Preem ption ......................................... 286
C. Commerce Clause ............................... 287
D. Recent legislative developments ........................ 288
V I. CONCLUSION ............................................. 290
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in C7S Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America
allows tender offerors to be subjected to state intervention when making a hostile
takeover. The Court's decision suggests either that it had a change of heart con-
cerning hostile takeovers subsequent to its holding in Edgar v. MITE Corp. ,2
or that the states have found a loophole using their corporate internal affairs
powers to constitutionally intervene into corporate tender offers.
This casenote will explore the Dynamics decision in an attempt to determine
what future hostile takeovers will have as a method of corporate acquisition.
1. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
2. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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II. FACrS
On March 10, 1986, Dynamics Corporation of America (Dynamics) announced
a tender offer to purchase one million shares of voting stock in CTS Corpora-
tion, a corporation in which Dynamics already owned 9.6% of its common stock.
3
CTS is incorporated in Indiana, where corporate takeover legislation has recently
been enacted. 4 The legislation included provisions placing restrictions on tender
offers.5 Because the Board of Directors of CTS was opposed to the Dynamics
tender offer,6 it elected to have CTS fall within the statute's provisions as allowed
by law. This required a period of at least fifty days wherein Dynamics had no
voting privileges with respect to the shares it acquired in the tender offer. Dy-
namics then brought an action in district court 7 against CTS and its Board of
Directors seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from CTS's utilization of In-
diana's newly enacted statute. Dynamics alleged that the Indiana Control Shares
Acquisition Act (Indiana Act) violated the commerce and the supremacy clauses
of the United States Constitution and that because the Indiana Act conflicted
with specified provisions of the Williams Act9 it was preempted by federal law.
The district court found for Dynamics on both issues and granted injunctive
relief?° CTS appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed." The court of ap-
peals based its decision on the plurality opinion in Edgar v. MITE Corp. 2,2 where
the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an Illinois statute which restricted hostile
takeovers0 3 In MITE, the Court held that the Illinois statute in question upset
3. 107 S. Ct. at 1642.
4. IND. CODE § 23-1-17 (Supp. 1986).
5. Id. at § 23-1-42. In general, this article applies to all domestic corporations in existence on July
31, 1987, in the state of Indiana. However, it allows for the corporation's board of directors to elect to have
the corporation fall under its provisions before that date. Id. at § 23-1-17-3. Under the Control Shares Ac-
quisition Chapter, IND. CODE § 23-1-42, an acquisition of control shares in an issuing public corporation,
defined in § 23-1-42-4(a), which would bring its voting powers above any of the thresholds (i.e., 20%, 33
1/3 %, or 50%) would fall under its provisions. The statute precludes the control shares from obtaining vot-
ing rights until so granted by majority vote of all disinterested shareholders. Id. at § 23-1-42-9(b) (i.e.,
shareholders exclusive of the acquirer, officers, and employee/directors). The meeting required by the sta-
tute must be held within 50 days of the offer, if the acquirer so requests when submitting the offer or, no
later than the next annual stockholders' meeting. Id. at § 23-1-42-7(b).
6. On the same day of its offer, Dynamics announced that it wanted the CTS Corp. Board of Directors
replaced by candidates it would choose. Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986).
7. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. IIl. 1986).
8. IND. CODE § 23-142-1 to -11 (Supp. 1986).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982 & Supp. III 1986). See infra note 11.
10. 637 F. Supp. 389, 400 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
11. Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986).
12. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
13. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.51, 137.70 (1979) (repealed 1983).
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the balance between a tender offeror and target management and, therefore, was
preempted by the Williams Act.'
III. HISTORY
A. Background of Williams Act
Prior to the Williams Act, tender offers were virtually unregulated by any pro-
visions in the Securities Exchange Act of 19345 As a result, tender offers16 grew
in popularity as a means of corporate acquisition because other corporate takeover
methods, such as proxy contests and exchange offers, were heavily regulated
by the SEC 7 Prior to the passage of the Williams Act, when a tender offer was
made, shareholders in target corporations were initially faced with investment
decisions similar to those of proxy contests but were forced to make these deci-
sions without the information which SEC regulations required for proxy con-
tests.' Because of this inconsistency the Williams Act was passed by Congress
to augment the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by regulating tender offers. 9
The Williams Act provides for disclosure by the offeror to the SEC and all share-
holders of record of the same information which would be available if the ac-
quisition had been accomplished through the market channels. 20 The Williams
Act further provides for additional protection of the shareholders by insuring
that all are treated equally2l -and requires a minimum time period for the offer
to remain open so that shareholders are given an opportunity to make a rational
decision .22
14. The drafters of the Williams Act were very mindful of the positions that the tender offeror and incumbent
management could take with respect to the individual shareholders. As stated by the Senate Committee:
The Committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in
favor of management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid. The bill is designed
to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the same time providing
the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case.
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967).
15. Note, The Developing Meaning of 'ender Offer" Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1250, 1253 (1973).
16. The Williams Act fails to provide the definition of "tender offer." For a definition, see E. ARANOW,
H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 70 (1973) (a tender offer is "a
public offer or solicitation by a company, an individual or a group of persons to purchase during a fixed
period of time all or a portion of a class or classes of securities or a publicly held corporation at a specified
price or upon specified terms for case and for securities"). See infra note 29. See also Warren, Developments
in State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 Bus. LAW. 671 (1985).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)-(c) (1982 & Supp. III 1986) (regulation of proxy solicitation). 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c)
(1982 & Supp. III 1986) (regulation of exchange offers). For a discussion of the increase in popularity of
tender offers, see W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, 1563 (5th ed.
1980); Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisitions by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1967);
Warren, Developments in State Takeover Legislation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 Bus. LAW. 671, 672 (1985).
18. H. R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2811, 2812.
19. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (82 Stat.) 454
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) -(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)); see also supra note 1.
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d), 78m(d) (1982 & Supp. III 1986). See infra note 1.
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4)-(7) (1982 & Supp. III 1986).
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a)(1986).
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Senator Williams of New Jersey, for whom the Williams Act is named, ex-
pressed concern to Congress that because of the void in the SEC laws, corporate
acquisitions by direct purchase of a large portion of a target's stock were not
being properly regulated. 23 He also demonstrated that this type of acquisition
was gaining in popularity because it allowed the purchaser to avoid SEC regula-
tions and to shroud his acquisition purpose from the target shareholders.
24
Knowledge of such corporate maneuvers was needed to enable a shareholder
to make a rational decision, and this need is what prompted the enactment of
the Williams Act. However, Senator Williams was careful to explain that the
regulations in this area were not designed to hamper tender offers but rather
designed with "extreme care to avoid tipping the scales either in favor of manage-
ment or in favor of the person making the tender offer."25
B. Emergence of State Takeovers Statutes
Even though Congress passed the Williams Act as a response to the surge
of corporate acquisitions by tender offers, many states had already instituted laws
under their "blue sky" provisions which protected citizens and corporations within
the state from unfriendly takeovers. Many other states soon followed in developing
corporate "takeover statutes" in direct response to the increase of corporate ac-
quisitions. 26 These states' laws were defended as necessary to protect a state's
interest in its own corporations and shareholders within its borders. 27 The rele-
vant state interests were described as the fear that in-state corporate assets would
be acquired by outside interests, concern over its citizens losing jobs, and con-
cern that its shareholders within the state would receive less than fair value for
their stock. 28 One author has suggested that lobbying groups were actually formed
23. 113 CONG. REc. 24,664 (1967).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-43-101 to 107 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-512.5-101 to 108
(Supp. 1978) (repealed 1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1983); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 417E-1 to E-15
(1985) (repealed 1987); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to 1513 (1980) (repealed 1988); IND. CODE §§ 23-2-3-1
to 12 (1982); MD. Coa'S. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-901 to 908 (1985) (repealed 1986); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 110 C, §§ I to 13 (1985); WiS. STAT. § 552.01(6) (1985); see also Boehm, State Interests
and Interstate Commerce: A Look at the Theoretical Underpinnings of Takeover Legislation, 36 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 733 (1979); Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Offers, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 687 (1975).
27. Justice Powell could see the concerns of the states in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646
(1982), where he stated:
The corporate headquarters of the great national and multinational corporations tend to be
located in the large cities of a few states. When corporate headquarters are transferred out
of a city and state into one of these metropolitan centers, the State and locality from which
the transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly. Management personnel - many of whom
have provided community leadership - may move to the new corporate headquarters. Con-
tributions to cultural, charitable and educational life-both in terms of leadership and finan-
cial support-also tend to diminish when there is a move of corporate headquarters.
see also Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover Legislation After MITE: Standing Pat, Blue Sky, or Corporation
Law Concepts?, CORP. L. REV. 3 (1984).
28. Boehm, State Interests and Interstate Commerce: A Look at the Theoretical Underpinnings of Takeover
Legislation, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733, 746 (1979); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
648 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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by incumbent managers of in-state corporations to pass laws restricting takeovers
for fear of losing their jobs.29 Generally, these state laws were more restrictive
than the SEC rules and, therefore, resulted in a conflict with the United States
Constitution under the supremacy and commerce clauses.
The first case addressing state statutes regulating hostile takeovers was Great
Western United Corp. v. Kidwell,30 where the district court held the Idaho sta-
tute in question unconstitutional. 31 Many decisions followed which struck down
state statutes on the same grounds.
32
C. Supreme Court's Ruling in Edgar v. MITE
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp. 33 provided guide-
lines for the states to follow in enacting takeover statutes. MITE addressed an
Illinois statute which required the offeror to notify the Secretary of State twenty
days before the offer became effective. 35 During this twenty-day period, the Secre-
tary of State could hold a hearing to determine the "fairness" of the offer. 36 The
statute required the Secretary of State to deny registration of the offer upon finding
that it "fail[edl to provide full and fair disclosure to the offerees of all material
information concerning the take-over offer, or that the take-over offer [was]
inequitable or would work or tend to work a fraud or deceit upon the
offerees. . . .-37 MITE Corp., a Delaware corporation, was interested in pur-
chasing all of the outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet & Machine Co., a publicly-
held Illinois corporation. MITE announced the offer and filed the appropriate
information with the Securities and Exchange Commission on January 19, 1979.
However, it refused to follow the Illinois statute and instead filed suit in district
court on the same day challenging the statute. 38 MITE sought declaratory relief
and an injunction against the Illinois Secretary of State prohibiting that official
from enforcing the statute. On February 5, 1979, MITE published its offer in
29. R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 568 (1986).
30. 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977), affid, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on venue grounds
sub nom., Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
31. Id. The Court determined that the Idaho statute conflicted with the careful balance between the offeror
and management of the acquiring corporation as espoused in the Williams Act in that the statute allowed
considerable time delays of the tender offer process. Id. at 423. The Court relied on Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) to find that Idaho failed to show a legitimate local interest in the statute and that
the burden on interstate commerce outweighed the benefit to the state in enforcing the statute. 439 F. Supp.
at 424.
32. For a listing of decisions holding state takeover disclosure laws unconstitutional, see Note, The 1983
Amendments to Pennsylvania's Business Corporation Law: Unconstitutional? Mite Be, 89 DICK. L. REV.
401, 408, n.75 (1985); see also Note, Second Generation State Takeover Legislation: Maryland Takes a
New Tack, 83 MICH. L. REV. 433, 440-41, n.44 (1984).
33. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.121 1/2, para. 137.51-137.70 (1979) (repealed 1983).
35. Id. at para. 137.54.E.
36. Id. at para. 137.57.A.
37. Id. at para. 137.57.E.
38. 457 U.S. at 628..
19881
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the Wall Street Journal. On February 9, the district court granted the injunc-
tion, declaring that the Illinois statute violated the commerce clause and was
preempted by the Williams Act. 3 Although MITE subsequently decided not
to make the tender offer, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 40 The Court reasoned
that the Illinois statute4 1 exposed MITE to civil and criminal liabilities stem-
ming from the Secretary of State's announcement of his intention to enforce it. 42
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with this reasoning in finding the case not to
be moot. 43The Court noted three provisions of the Illinois statute that upset
the balance between the offeror and incumbent management and, therefore, were
expressly prohibited by the Williams Act. "First, the Court viewed the twenty-
day waiting period enforced on the offeror as providing the target company with
additional time within which to take steps to combat the offer. Such a tool,
the Court reasoned, is "precisely what Congress determined should be avoided,
and for this reason, the precommencement notification provision frustrates the
objectives of the Williams Act."4 Second, the provisions in the Illinois statute
47
which allow the Secretary of State to conduct hearings on the tender offer were
seen by the Court as an additional tool which management could use to further
delay the tender offer. 48Third, the Illinois statute required the Secretary of State
to deny registration if he found the offer inequitable. 49The Court noted that
the legislative intent of the Williams Act was to allow only the shareholder to
make such decisions. Because the Illinois statute conflicted with the Williams
Act in these three areas, the Court found the Illinois statute to be unconstitu-
tional under the supremacy clause. 50
The second constitutional challenge under which the Illinois statute failed was
its violation of the commerce clause. 51 The Court cited Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc. 52 which held: "[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
39. Id.
40. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, affd sub nom, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
41. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.63, 137.65 (1979) (repealed 1983).
42. 633 F.2d at 488.
43. 457 U.S. at 630.
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n (d)-(f) (1982 & Supp. IU 1986); see Senator Williams testimony to
the Senate. 113 CONG. REc. 24,664 (1967).
45. 457 U.S. at 635.
46. 457 U.S. at 635; see infra note 52. A precommencement notification proposal was specifically re-
jected by Congress during deliberations on the 1970 amendments to the Williams Act. H.R. 4285, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1970).
47. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.57A-D (1979) (repealed 1983).
48. See Wilmer & Tandy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FoRD
L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1976).
49. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.57E (1979) (repealed 1983).
50. 457 U.S. at 641.
51. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
52. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits' 53 The Court found
those provisions of the Illinois statutes which granted Illinois the power to regulate
tender offers occurring entirely outside the state to be "obvious burden[s]" on
interstate commerce. 55 The Court found the local benefits of the Illinois statute 5
6
to be "insufficient to outweigh the burdens Illinois imposes on interstate
commerce." 7
D. The Aftermath of MITE and the Lower Court's Application of its Rationale
Following the Supreme Court's decision in MITE, state statutes which attempted
to inhibit corporate takeovers by regulating tender offers were struck down by
the lower courts utilizing the MITE rationale. 58 The courts found little problem
invalidating state statutes similar to Illinois' on both commerce clause and suprema-
cy clause arguments. The only statute which survived both arguments was ad-
dressed in Cardiff Acquisitions v. Hatch5 which concerned Minnesota's Corporate
Takeovers Act (the Minnesota Act). 0 The Minnesota Act, revised after the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in MITE, was found constitutional in almost all respects
in Cardiff. Briefly stated, the Minnesota Act requires the tender offeror to file
with Minnesota's Commissioner of Commerce a registration statement when the
offer is made. 6' The Commissioner may suspend the tender offer within three
days only if the registration materials fail to apprise local investors of informa-
tion similar to that required by the Williams Act. 62 The Minnesota Act only
applies to tender offers when at least twenty percent of the target's shareholders
are Minnesota residents and the target has "substantial assets" in the state, and
53. Id. at 142, (citing Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)).
54. 457 U.S. at 643, where the Court stated: "Thus the [Illinois statute] could be applied to regulate
a tender offer which would not affect a single Illinois shareholder." Id.
55. 457 U.S. at 644.
56. Id. The Illinois Attorney General claimed that the [Illinois statute] served to protect its resident share-
holders and corporations within the state.
57. Id.
58. See Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 1949
(1987) (Ohio law); Telvest v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983) (Virginia law); North Star Intern.
v. Arizona Corp. Com'n., 720 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1983) (Arizona law); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix
Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982) (Michigan law); National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d
1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri law); Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (Missouri law);
Newell Co. v. Connolly, 624 F. Supp. 126 (D. Mass. 1985) (Massachusetts law); see also supra note 43.
59. 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984). While the court upheld the constitutionality of the Minnesota Act
as applied to the facts of the case, it did hold one provision in the Minnesota Act unconstitutional. See infra
note 67-8.
60. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B, 302A (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
61. The Minnesota Act does not provide for a precommencement filing period, does not allow a hearing
at the request of the target corporation and requires registration materials within nineteen calendar days from
the announcement of the offer (well before the twenty business days from the period stipulated in the Wil-
liams Act). See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
62. Id. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.03(2),(6) (West 1986 & Supp. 1988). The Minnesota Act requires
more detailed information than the Williams Act, such as the offeror's financial statements, information con-
cerning its business activities and affiliations, description of any pending legal or administrative proceed-
ings, etc.
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then the Minnesota Act applies only to Minnesota residents .6 3 The Minnesota
Act, therefore, did not present the far reaching aspects which the Illinois statute
in MITE6 1 contained. In applying the balancing test espoused in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc. '6 the court in Cardiff found that Minnesota's local interests out-
weighed the burdens placed by the Minnesota Act on interstate commerce; there-
fore, the Minnesota Act was found constitutional in relation to the commerce
clause. 66 In examining the alleged supremacy clause violations of the Minneso-
ta Act, the court held that the additional disclosures required by it did not con-
flict with the Williams Act except to the extent that the Minnesota Act required
"such additional information as the commissioner by rule prescribes."6 7 The court
found these discretional provisions to provide Minnesota's Commissioner with
the ability to require irrelevant data; and therefore, this portion of the Minneso-
ta Act was held unconstitutional."
The Michigan takeover statute 9 was addressed by the federal courts on two
different occasions. 70 The Michigan statute attempted to refine some of the flaws
of the Illinois statute struck down in Edgar v. MITE71 by shortening the advance
notice required to be given to the state by ten days and by restricting the hearing
granted to encompass only the disclosure aspects of the offer. 72 Even though
the Michigan legislature attempted to water down the unconstitutional provisions
found in the Illinois statute when drafting its own statute, the Sixth Circuit in-
validated the statute using the MITE court rationale in Martin-Marietta Corp.
v. Bendix Corp. 73 However, a later ruling, L. P Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 74 up-
held the statute as it applied to a non-publicly held corporation.
L. P Acquisition Co. v. Tyson15 involved a corporation which owned a major
newspaper in Michigan and two radio stations in Detroit. The corporation was
63. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.01(8).
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.52-10 (1979) (repealed 1983). The Illinois Act could be
applied when a corporation had its principal office in Illinois or if it was organized in Illinois; even if none
of its shareholders resided in the state.
65. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
66. 751 F.2d 906, 911 (1984). The court noted that interstate commerce was only indirectly burdened
in offers where the target company had "substantial" numbers of Minnesota shareholders. Id.
67. Id. at 914 (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.03(2)).
68. Id. at 914.
69. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN., §§ 451.901-7 (West Supp. 1988).
70. L. P. Acquisition Co. v. Tyson, 772 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1985); Martin-Marietta Corp. v, Bendix
Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982).
71. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
72. The Illinois Statute required the offeror to file a registration statement with the state twenty days
prior to the offering. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 137.54.E (1979) (repealed 1983), whereas the
Michigan statute required a ten day filing notification to the state. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 451.905(1)
(West Supp. 1988). Also the Illinois Statute allowed the Secretary of State to decide on the "fairness" of
the offer before it became effective, ILL. REV. STAT. para. 137.57.E, but the Michigan Act allowed its Secretary
to decide on only the disclosure aspects of the registration statement. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN., § 451.908(3).
73. 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982). The court held the act to violate both the commerce and supremacy
clauses relying on arguments closely paralleling those made in MITE. Id.




closely held and its shares did not require registration with the SEC. Accord-
ingly, the disclosure requirements under the Williams Act were inapplicable to
the tender offer made by L. P. Acquisition for shares in a Michigan corpora-
tion. Also the court distinguished this case from the precedent laid down in
Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 76because fifty percent of the share-
holders of the Michigan target corporation resided within the state and because
the tender offer did not fall under the Williams Act disclosure requirements. 11
Based on these distinctions, the court held that the Michigan statute7 8 did not
violate the commerce clause. 7 Because of the delay provisions80 contained in
the Michigan statute, however, the court found that it violated the supremacy
clause. 81
As more state statutes regulating tender offers were struck down by the courts
following MITE, state legislators enacted laws which regulated the corporation
in a tender offer situation rather than regulating the tender offer itself. These
statutes are commonly called "second generation" state takeover statutes and at-
tempt to regulate tender offers by regulating the internal affairs of corporations
organized within the state's borders. This area of corporate law has traditionally
been left to the states. An example of these "second generation" statutes is Min-
nesota's Control Share Acquisition Act 82 (Control Act), which was enacted to
supplement the Corporate Take-Over Act 83 addressed in Cardiff. The Control
Act was evaluated in Gelco Corp. v. Conniston Partners' where it was used
in an attempt to block a hostile takeover of Gelco Corporation. The Control
Act is very similar to the Indiana Act addressed in C7S Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of American in that it allows the shareholders to block the offer through a majority
vote held no later than twenty days after the offeror submits an information state-
ment to the target corporation. This provision loosely applies to a corporation
having fifty or more shareholders and having its principal place of business or
substantial assets located in Minnesota. 86 The district court relied heavily on
76. 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982).
77. 772 F.2d at 207.
78. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 451.907-17 (West Supp. 1988).
79. 772 F.2d at 207.
80. The Michigan Act contained three delay provisions. First, the statute provided for a ten day delay
after the offeror filed a registration statement with the state and publicly disclosed the terms of the offer.
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 451.905(3). After this ten day period, the statute required that the offer stay
open for an additional 60 days. § 451.905(4). Also, the statute allowed the state to enjoin the offer for failure
to provide full disclosure to the offerees. §§ 451.907-08.
81. 772 F.2d at 209. The court found these delays to conflict with the twenty day minimum period of
the Williams Act. Id.
82. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
83. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B and 302A.
84. 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1986). The Control Act was first addressed in APL Ltd. Partnership
v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Minn. 1985). However, because the Control Act was invali-
dated on grounds similar to the ones discussed in Gelco, an analysis of this case is omitted.
85. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
86. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.011.39.
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the balancing test in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 17 in holding the Control Act
to be in violation of the commerce clause. 8 The court looked at the fact that
the Control Act applied to an outside tender offer, but exempted a management
self-tender, and that it applied even when no Minnesota residents were involved. 8
Although the time frame in the Control Act coincided with that of the Williams
Act,90 the court considered that the possibility of delays in the vote count or
in receiving mailed proxies "could easily prevent the acquirer from beginning
to make purchases at twelve midnight of the twenty-first business day... 91
Because the Control Act could be applied to corporations which had no share-
holders residing in Minnesota or to corporations which were not even incorpo-
rated in Minnesota, the court found the Control Act a heavy burden on interstate
commerce with few corresponding benefits. 9 2 In declaring the Control Act
preempted by federal law, the court stated: "by depriving individual shareholders
of the right to make independent decisions regarding offers to sell, there is con-
flict with the Williams Act objective. ... ,93 This decision is indicative of the
lower court's application of the precedent laid down in Edgar v. MITE and other
cases addressing "first generation" statutes when confronted with a "second gener-
ation' statute such as Minnesota's. Although the "second generation" statutes at-
tempted to regulate tender offers by utilizing the corporate structure to apply
state law, the lower courts applied a "substance over form" type of analysis to
strike down such statutes.
Ohio's Control Share Acquisition Act, 94 another "second generation" statute
was addressed in Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman. 9 ' This Ohio statute is
highly relevant to an analysis of C7S Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America
9 6
because the Indiana Act in question in Dynamics was patterned after the Ohio
statute analyzed in Fleet Aerospace. A discussion of the similarities and differ-
ences between the two statutes is necessary to the analysis of Fleet Aerospace.
The Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act applied to domestic corporations with
fifty or more shareholders and having their principal place of business or sub-
stantial assets within the state. 97 The Ohio statute also required the offeror to
deliver an "acquiring person statement" to the issuing public corporation with
87. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
88. 652 F. Supp. at 840.
89. Id. at 841.
90. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1986).
91. 652 F. Supp. at 841. The court strictly construed the Williams Act to hold that the possibility of
such a slight delay created a possible burden on interstate commerce by hampering the tender offers.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 844.
94. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Baldwin 1986 & Supp. 1987).
95. 637 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ohio 1986) affd, 772 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987).
96. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
97. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.01(y). The Indiana Act in Dynamics requires one hundred or more
shareholders, principal place of business or substantial assets within the state and more than ten percent
ownership of the corporation's shares by Indiana residents. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-4(3)(A) (Supp. 1986).
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information similar to that required in the Williams Act. 98 After this informa-
tion was received, the acquiring corporation was to call a special meeting of
the shareholders to be held no later than fifty days after receipt of the statement
in order to vote on the proposed offer. 99 The district court held that the fifty
day delay provision of the Ohio statute directly conflicted with the twenty day
delay provision of the Williams Act and provided "incumbent manage-
ment... with additional time in which to defeat the tender offer." l The affir-
mative vote required by the Ohio statute was another provision which the court
determined "impermissibly tip[ped] the scales in favor of incumbent
management"10° and deprived a shareholder of an opportunity to make an in-
dependent decision. 102 In response to arguments that the Ohio statute violated
the commerce clause by imposing a direct regulation on interstate commerce,
the state defendants argued that such powers were constitutionally allowed to
a state in regulating its corporations' internal affairs. 103 However, because the
Ohio statute applied to Ohio corporations regardless of whether or not their share-
holders were Ohio residents, the court determined the Ohio statute to be a bur-
den on interstate commerce. lo0 Utilizing the balancing test enunciated in Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 105 the court found the state's interests in the takeover regu-
lation insufficient to validate the concomitant restraint on interstate commerce. 106
Hawaii is another state which enacted a takeover statute 1 0 7 patterned after that
of Ohio. Because its provisions are so similar to the Ohio statute addressed in
Fleet Aerospace, a detailed discussion here would be redundant. Hawaii's sta-
tute was the subject of litigation in Terry v. Yamashita108 where the court sum-
marily struck down its provisions as violative of both the commerce and supremacy
98. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831(B). The Indiana Act has no such requirement.
99. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (C). With respect to the shareholders meeting and the fifty day
delay, the Ohio and Indiana statutes are similar. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-9. However, the vote under the Ohio
statute is whether to approve or disapprove the offer, whereas the vote under the Indiana Act is whether
or not to convey voting rights to the shares purchased by the offer. Also, the Ohio statute allows the acquisi-
tion only after "an affirmative vote of a majority of the voting power.. .and [an affirmative vote of] a majori-
ty of the portion of such voting power excluding the voting power of interested shares." OHIo REv. CODE
ANN. § 1701.83 1(E). The Indiana Act is more lenient, requiring only a majority vote of all disinterested
shares in order to convey voting rights to the shares purchased by the offeror. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-9(b)(Supp.
1986).
100. 637 F. Supp. at 757.
101. Id. at 758.
102. Id. at 759.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 761.
105. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
106. 637 F. Supp. at 764. In response to the "internal affairs" argument, the court noted that the internal
structure of a corporation is not changed by a takeover as it is by a merger or consolidation; therefore, the
state statute fell under MITE and various lower court decisions which held that tender offers fall outside
of the "internal affairs" of a corporation. Id. at 763.
107. HAW. REv. STAT. § 416-171-72 (1985) (Repealed 1987).
108. 643 F.2d 161 (D. Haw. 1986) repealed by Law of 1987, ch. 35, (208).
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clauses. The court held the same aspects of the statute to be unconstitutional
as did the court in Fleet Aerospace.
IV. INSTANT CASE
A. Majority Opinion
In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, the United States Supreme Court
was once again presented with the same issues addressed in their earlier deci-
sion in Edgar v. MITE Corp. ; 109 a violation of the supremacy clause and the
commerce clause by a state statute regulating hostile tender offers.
In reviewing the lower court's decision, the United States Supreme Court first
examined the purpose of the Williams Act and its provisions which regulated
corporate takeovers. 110 The Court then reviewed the conclusion of the plurality
opinion in Edgar v. MITE, which held that "a major aspect of the effort to pro-
tect the investor [is] to avoid favoring either management or the takeover bid-
der.71 In weighing the interests of management and those of the takeover bidder,
the Court found no offending features in the Indiana Act, stating that "the sta-
tute now before the Court protects the independent shareholder against both of
the contending parties." 12 The Court analyzed the provision in the Indiana Act
allowing the disinterested shareholders to vote as a group and held this coercive
aspect of the statute to be a vital tool in providing for the best interests of both
the takeover bidder and management. 113 In addressing the additional thirty-day
delay which the Indiana Act imposes over the requirements of the Williams Act, "4
the Court concluded that the Indiana Act does not require a fifty-day delay or
prohibit offerors from purchasing shares within the federal guidelines. "I The
109. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
110. The Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982 & Supp. 1111986), provides that tender
offerors must submit information concerning the offer to the SEC. Such information includes the background
and identity of the offeror, the source and amount of the funds to be used in the purchase, the purpose of
the purchase (i.e. plans of liquidation or other changes in corporate structure) and the extent of the offeror's
holdings in the target company.
The Williams Act also protects the stockholders during the acquisition period. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5)
(1982 Supp. & III 1986) allows stockholders who tender their shares to withdraw them during the first 15
days of the offer and, if the offeror has not purchased their shares, any time after 60 days from commence-
ment of the offer. The offer must remain open for at least 20 business days. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1986).
In the event more shares are offered than are sought for purchase, pro rata selling provisions apply to each
tendering shareholder. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(8) (1986). Also, each shareholder is guaranteed to receive for
each of his shares the highest price paid for any shares sold during the entire period of the tender offer.
§ 78n(d) (7) (1982 & Supp. III 1986).
111. 457 U.S. at 652.
112. 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1645 (1987).
113. Id. at 1646.
114. The Williams Act requires the tender offeror to keep his offer open for at least 20 business days,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (a) (1986); whereas the Indiana Act requires the disinterested shareholders to have
a meeting and vote on whether or not to provide voting rights to the shares tendered. The meeting must
be within 50 days after the acquiror issues a written request or no later than the next annual shareholder's
meeting. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-7(b) & (c) (Supp. 1986).
115. 107 S. Ct. at 1647.
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Court reasoned that if the offeror was concerned about an adverse shareholder
vote, it could condition its offer on receiving voting rights before a certain date. "I
In addition, the Court noted that the Indiana Act does not preclude shareholders
from calling a meeting to vote before the required period, if enough are recep-
tive to the offer. The Court also found nothing in MITE which indicated that
any delay under the state regulations would necessarily conflict with the Wil-
liams Act. 117 Concern over the number of state corporate laws which could pos-
sibly be in conflict with the Williams Act, if time constraints were to be a
consideration, was the final factor which persuaded the Court to find no preemp-
tion of the Indiana Act by the Williams Act. 118
The second issue addressed by the Court was the alleged commerce clause
violations of the Indiana Act. Discrimination against interstate commerce is neces-
sary for a state statute to be in violation of the commerce clause. 119 The Court
found nothing in the Indiana Act which discriminated against out-of-state offerors
over in-state offerors. 120 The Court specifically denied the argument which stated
that a violation would occur if more out-of-state offerors than in-state offerors
were affected quoting Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 1 2 1 which states
to the contrary.
Noting that a corporation is a legal entity created by state law, the Court found
ample grounds on which a state could enact laws regulating corporations formed
in that state. In this regard the Court found that the Indiana Act operates only
to protect the shareholders of Indiana corporations by arming them to defend
their interest in hostile takeover battles. 122 The Court held: "the possibility of
coercion in some takeover bids offers additional justification for Indiana's deci-
sion to promote the autonomy of independent shareholders.'" 23
Dynamics' also alleged that the Indiana Act was unconstitutional because it
limited the number of successful tender offers. Because the Indiana Act did not
prohibit any entity from purchasing shares in Indiana corporations, the Court
held that:
Indiana need not define these commodities as other states do; it need only provide
that residents and non-residents have equal access to them. This Indiana has done.
Accordingly, even if the [Indiana] Act should decrease the number of successful tender




119. Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36-37 (1980).
120. 107 S. Ct. at 1649.
121. 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978). "The fact that the burden of a state regulation falls on some interstate
companies does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce." Id.
122. 107 S. Ct. at 1651.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1652.
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B. Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia concurred in the majority opinion of the Court, but believed
it unnecessary to consider the issues espoused in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 125
where an additional factor of weighing the burden on commerce against the lo-
cal benefits of the statute was utilized. Justice Scalia considered such a factor
to be ill-suited to most commerce clause questions because, as in this case, the
Indiana Act protects both management and the shareholders when faced with
a tender offer. 126 He considered it outside the Court's function to determine if
those factors outweighed any "industrial stagnation" 127 imposed under the Indi-
ana Act. Justice Scalia would also have dismissed the preemption argument un-
der the express provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.128 The 1934
Act provides that nothing it contains "shall affect the jursidiction of the securi-
ties commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any state
over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provi-
sions (emphasis added) of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder" 129
In accord with this wording, Justice Scalia considered the purpose of the Wil-
liams Act to be irrelevant since only its provisions were to be considered.
C White's Dissent
Justice White dissented on both issues, and was joined by Justices Blackmun
and Stevens as to the Indiana Act's commerce clause violation. Justice White
saw the purpose of the Williams Act (i.e. investor protection) to be confused
by the majority with protecting shareholders as a group. 130 Justice White found
the Indiana Act to hamper the individual shareholder, who wants to sell his stock
to a tender offeror, by allowing the other shareholders to act as a group to block
the offer. 131 Justice White found this violative of the spirit of the Williams Act.
In his argument regarding the commerce clause violations, in which Justices
Blackmun and Stevens joined, Justice White saw the Indiana Act as imposing
restrictions on prospective purchasers of CTS stock if the purchase exceeded
the percentages stated in the Indiana Act (i.e. 20%, 33 1/3%, 50%). 132 Because
CTS stock is openly traded on the New York Stock Exchange, Justice White
saw the restrictions as "regulating the purchase and sale of shares of stock in
interstate commerce."133 He, therefore, viewed the Indiana Act as violating the
commerce clause. 134
125. 397 U.S. 137, 141 (1972).
126. 107 S. Ct. at 1652.
127. Id. at 1653.
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1986)).
130. Id. at 1654.
131. Id. at 1655-56.
132. IND. CODE § 23-1-42-1 (Supp. 1986).
133. 107 S. Ct. at 1655.
134. Id.
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V. ANALYSIS
A. The Unexplained Departure from MITE
The Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE1 35 set forth clear guidelines
as to what aspects of state takeover statutes were impermissible on constitution-
al grounds. In MITE, the Court held that because Congress, through the Wil-
liams Act, intended investors to make their own decisions when faced with tender
offers, state statutes which favor the incumbent management side of a hostile
takeover controversy frustrate the purpose of the Williams Act and are therefore
preempted. 1 36 The MITE Court also found commerce clause violations in state
takeover statutes which burden interstate tender offers to a greater degree than
any local benefits the statute purports to offer. 137 This rationale, albeit disclosed
in a plurality opinion, became a yardstick that was frequently applied by the
lower courts in the years following the MITE decision to determine which state
statutes remained valid. It should be noted that the only state statute which, when
applied in conjunction with the Williams Act, was upheld in this post-MITE era
was the Minnesota Corporate Take-Overs Act 138 as addressed in Cardiff Acqui-
sitions, Inc. v. Hatch. 139 However, an analysis of the provisions of that Min-
nesota Act reveal it to be purely an information-gathering mechanism which falls
well within the parameters of the Williams Act and the Pike balancing test. 140
The Minnesota legislature carefully drafted the Minnesota Act to ensure that
it would apply only when the state's interests rose to a level which justified the
state's intervention. Even then the Minnesota Act allows the state to require only
such disclosure to shareholders as is consistent with federal law.
As state legislators revised their laws, the courts were faced with harder deci-
sions in the corresponding statutory analysis. Courts often followed one another's
reasoning rather than the MITE rationale, largely due to the metamorphosis of
the statutes from the "first generation" to the "second generation' which les-
sened the precedential value of MITE. This can be most readily seen in Gelco
Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 141 where the state statute in question had been re-
vised twice since its enactment, each time conforming to recent court decisions
on similar statutes. 12 However, this change in the state's approach to regulation
of hostile takeovers did not immunize the regulations from reproach on the fun-
damental constitutional issues addressed in MITE. The post-MITE rulings by
the lower courts attest to this. The Supreme Court's decision in M7S Corp. v.
135. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
136. Id. at 641.
137. Id.
138. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B, 302A (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
139. 751 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1984).
140. See supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
141. 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1986).
142. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302.A.671; see also supra notes 101-02.
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Dynamics Corp. of America, 14 however, failed to adhere to the guidelines set
forth in MITE and its progeny.
The critical aspects of the Court's ruling in CTS lie primarily in two areas:
the potential for delay which the Indiana Act allows and the Indiana Act's bur-
den on interstate commerce.
B. Preemption
The Court's discussion of the fifty-day delay provision in the Indiana Act failed
to address the consequences of this provision. This delay allows for additional
time in which incumbent management can attempt to thwart the offer. This pro-
motes the precise favoritism which Congress expressly avoided when enacting
the Williams Act. 144 Because such defensive tactics can be initiated by incum-
bent management at the announcment of the tender offer, the time element is
one of the most important factors in corporate takeovers. 1 45 Statutes which pro-
vide for open-ended delay or any delay beyond that prescribed by the Williams
Act should be preempted. 4 The lower courts applied sound reasoning in their
discussion of preemption issues in the cases dealing with "second generation"
statutes decided prior to C/S. 147 The courts determined that any state statute,
such as Indiana's, which require lengthy time delays pending shareholder ap-
proval "frustrates the objectives of the Williams Act in a substantial manner."1 18
However, the Court in C7S reasoned that the delays are not mandatory in the
state statutes and that if the offeror is vitally interested in the time factor, he
could condition his offer on receiving voting rights before a certain date. 14 9 Such
a conclusion denies the realities of the tender offer process and fails to consider
this time delay in its actual light, given the natural conflicts of interest in a hostile
takeover between incumbent management and the offeror.
Although proponents of the Indiana Act argued that this additional time was
needed to allow shareholders the opportunity to make rational decisions, they
failed to demonstrate that such additional time provided a meaningful differ-
ence in the shareholders' decisions. One can only speculate as to why the Court
143. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982 & Supp. 111 1986), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1986) (for the period prescribed
by federal law); see 113 CONG. REC. 24,664 (1987) (comments of Senator Williams).
145. See Shipman, In Defense of Reasonable State Regulation of Tender Offers, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV.
99 (1987).
146. See Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1986); Fleet Aerospace Corp.
v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ohio 1986), afftd, 772 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated, 107 S.
Ct. 1949 (1987).
147. See Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829 (D. Minn. 1986); Terry v. Yamashita, 643
F. Supp. 161, 168 (D. Haw. 1986); Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ohio
1986), affd, 772 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987); see also Langevoort, The Supreme
Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,
101 HARv. L. REv. 96, 110 (1987).
148. Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ohio 1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 1949
(1987).
149. 107 S. Ct. at 1647.
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failed to address the statute's underlying purpose of deterring tender offers. Sug-
gestions have been made that the Court's decision reflects its recent distaste of
corporate takeovers. 150 Such a conclusion is not without merit. 151 The Court's
apparent disfavor of tender offers should not have been a factor in determining
the constitutionality of the Indiana statute in CIS as such bias impedes the
judiciary's function under the Constitution.
C. Commerce Clause
In holding that the Indiana Act did not violate the commerce clause, the C7S
Court failed to address the primary arguments on this issue: the Indiana Act's
application to out-of-state shareholders and its purported local benefits. The Court
found the Indiana Act nonviolative of the commerce clause because it has the
same effect on in-state offerors as it does to out-of-state offerors and because
it does not subject tender offerors to inconsistent regulations. 152 In reaching this
conclusion the Court categorized the Indiana Act as a "corporate law," an area
properly left to the states under their police powers. While this conclusion is
sound and amply supported, 53 it does not end the determination. Although the
Indiana Act might properly be considered a "corporate law," it is not one that
involves the internal structure of a corporation, but rather involves transactions
between shareholders and an interested purchaser where all of the parties may
be non-residents of the incorporating state. Because the Indiana Act would pro-
hibit two out-of-state individuals from consummating a transaction involving shares
in an Indiana corporation, it is clearly violative of the commerce clause. The
internal affairs doctrine allows states to regulate corporate acts but does not al-
low the regulation of shareholder acts, especially if the shareholder is a non-
resident. The Minnesota legislature understood this principle when drafting its
legislation on corporate takeovers, and allowed their act to apply only to Min-
nesota residents. ' 5 4 The Minnesota Act was the only one to pass muster when
the lower courts addressed state takeover statutes after MITE. 155 However, the
Indiana Act effectively precludes purchases of shares in Indiana corporations
when a majority of shareholders refuse to give the purchaser voting rights, thereby
violating the commerce clause just as blatantly as the Illinois Statute struck down
in MITE. The Court's departure from this sound application of the commerce
clause, and more importantly, its general silence in addressing the commerce
clause issue, has created further ambiguity in the area of corporate takeovers.
150. See Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on CMS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96, 111 (1987).
151. See Scherer, Takeovers: Present and Future Dangers, 4 BRooKiNGS REV. 15 (Winter/Spring 1986).
152. 107 S. Ct. at 1648-49.
153. See Sargent, Do the Second Generation State Takeover Statutes Violate the Commerce Clause?, 8
CoRP. L. REV. 3 (1985); Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doctrine
in Corporation Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 29 (1987).
154. See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B, 302A (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
155. See Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984).
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For whatever its reasons, the Court has opened the door for states to enact
antitakeover laws based on the Indiana Act which will result in hampering tender
offers nationwide. In fact, since the C7S decision thirteen states have passed
statutes patterned after Indiana's. 15 6 Because CIS allows states to further regu-
late this area, more restrictive state statutes are sure to follow which will create
further ambiguity in this area. 157 Such an approach by the states could backfire
because this added confusion could be exactly what the proponents of federal
preemption need in order to convince Congress that preemption is mandated
to resolve this dilemma.
Although not specifically stated in its opinion, the Court implied in CTS that
the state's power to grant corporate charters is the pivotal factor in allowing states
to regulate corporations chartered within their borders. From this a further im-
plication is that this factor also determines which state's laws governs. Much
attention has recently been given to Delaware, due to its sheer number of cor-
porate charters. After long deliberation, the Delaware legislature enacted a sta-
tute which appears to extend farther than Indiana's in regulating hostile
takeovers. 158 The law was challenged almost immediately after passage. 1 5 9 While
the outcome of this trial is still unknown, one thing is fairly certain; the losing
faction (i.e. pro-takeover or pro-states' rights) will go scurrying to Congress to
lobby for the implemention of federal legislation on its behalf. 16
D. Recent Legislative Developments
Takeover legislation in Congress is currently spearheaded primarily by three
bills: a Senate bill 1 6' backed by Banking Committee Chairman Senator William
Proxmire of Wisconsin and two House bills, the Dingell-Markey bill 162 and the
Lent-Rinaldo bill. 163 The Senate bill favors state intervention and tough federal
156. 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 38 at 98. Some states have gone even farther than Indiana in
the breadth of their statutes since the CTS decision. Id. at 99.
157. Such ambiguity is largely the result of the Court's indecision as to how far a state can go in regulating
a hostile takeover. This will allow states to enact statutes which will have a farther reach than the Indiana
statute addressed in CMS. For further comments on this concern, see 19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.
29 at 1012 (July 10, 1987). For an example of state statutes which extend farther than Indiana's, see 20
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5 at 188 (Feb. 5, 1988), (Delaware's new law).
158. See 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5 at 188 (Feb. 5, 1988). Generally, the law requires bidders
to purchase all of the outstanding shares of the target if the bidder already owns fifteen percent of the target
shares; a provision which will be very difficult to attain considering incumbent management stock owner-
ship. Also, the law only applies to publicly traded Delaware corporations. Id.
159. CRTF Corp. v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 0487 (LBS).
160. See 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 3 at 106 (Jan. 15, 1988) for comments from Charbo Richards,
attorney in the law firm of Richards, Layton & Finger in Wilmington, Delaware.
161. S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
162. H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
163. H.R. 2668, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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regulation, 16 while the Dingell-Markey bill provides for a more comprehen-
sive federal regulatory scheme. 165 The Lent-Rinaldo bill is basically the Repub-
lican version of the Dingell-Markey bill and is less restrictive on the actions
of takeover bidders. '6 6 Due to this dissension in Congress over its regulatory
role in this area, it appears that a resolution within the legislative branch will
not be quickly forthcoming.
While there are differing schools of thought on the attributes of tender offers,
the Court has apparently decided to take an ambiguous position, the settlement
of which will require legislative intervention. With the separation of powers doc-
trine in mind, such a course of action would have merit because this would allow
the proper branch to perform its law-making function. However, it is the Court's
ambiguity in its rationale which leaves this line of reasoning as only specula-
tion. In CiS, the Court had an opportunity to settle the conflict between tender
offerors and state statutes such as Indiana's but, instead, has "muddied the water"
by not addressing its position on the coercive aspects of state takeover statutes
such as Indiana's, and has failed to clarify its departure from MITE on the preemp-
tion issue. This will cause confusion and lack of uniformity in the lower courts
in analyzing similar statutes in the future. Which state statutes will survive on
this issue is far from clear.
Whether or not the SEC through its Section 14(e) powers16 7 has the ability
to clarify the ambiguity created by the C7S decision will surely be the arena
for further litigation in this area. Indeed, SEC chairman David S. Ruder has
requested that Congress allow SEC intervention in the area when Indiana-type
statutes are imposed on offers made on shares listed on the national stock ex-
changes. 168
But what of tender offers in the meantime? Presently, any SEC intervention
164. The bill requires a five-day period for filing diclosure information as opposed to the current ten-day
period under Rule 13(d) and requires the purchaser to state his intention when passing the five percent threshold
(i.e., if purchase is for investment or acquisition purposes). If the purchase is designated as an investment,
the purchaser is precluded from making a tender offer for sixty days. The bill also allows shareholders to
sue raiders to retrieve the profits obtained from an unsuccessful takeover. See 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 3 at 107 (Jan. 15, 1988).
165. H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). The Dingell-Markey bill (H.R. 2172) requires bidders
to make a tender offer to acquire more than 10 % of a target's stock, increases penalties for violation of Rule
13(d), requires offers to remain open for at least sixty calendar days, and prohibits management from granting
golden parachutes during a tender offer. See 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 3 at 107 (Jan. 15, 1988).
166. H.R. 2668, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). The Lent-Rinaldo bill (H.R. 2668) requires tender offers
to be kept open for at least thirty business days (as opposed to sixty calendar days in H.R. 2172) and requires
20% acquisitions to be made by tender offers (as compared to 10% in H.R. 2172). 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 3 at 108 (Jan. 15, 1988).
167. Section 14(e) provides the SEC with powers to "define, and prescribe means reasonably designed
to prevent such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982
& Supp. 111 1986). While it appears that such a grant of power would not support such actions on behalf
of the SEC, history indicates that broad discretion has been granted the SEC in other areas. See, Langevoort,
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would be subject to attack by the states as outside the granted powers of the SEC.
This may create a new line of cases appearing on the U.S. Supreme Court docket.
At any rate, any further time delay in resolving this issue will be to the states'
advantage because the longer these statutes are valid law, the harder it will be
for Congress or the SEC to preempt them. One can only surmise that hostile
tender offers considered on corporate shares organized in states such as Indiana
will be effectively halted if the incumbent management is not receptive to the
offer and takes advantage of the statute's provisions for time delays to establish
a shield of defensive tactics.
VI. CONCLUSION
MITE and its progeny establish well settled rules of law as to what legislative
acts of the states would be invalidated when found to interfere with the purpose
of the Williams Act. While it is commonly recognized that states are entitled
to regulate corporations created through their legislative grace, state corporate
takeover statutes conflict with the commerce clause when they prohibit an in-
terstate transaction between a buyer and seller of stock. Furthermore, the delay
provisions in the Indiana Act are contrary to the express provisions in the Wil-
liams Act and should, therefore, be preempted. One can only conclude that the
Court's silence on these issues and its departure from precedent indicate a sug-
gestion on its part that Congress or the SEC should clarify this area. Based upon
inaction in Congress on this issue, any immediate legislation is not likely. While
the SEC would gladly interject its support of tender offers by providing federal
preemption in this area, the Commission appears to be bound until Congress
expands its authority or the U.S. Supreme Court addresses this possible conflict
and allows for such intervention. Until then, tender offerors will definitely have
to be selective in deciding what corporations are open for hostile takeover, choos-
ing only those incorporated in states without Indiana-type takeover statutes.
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